Is this the year the [New Orleans Pelicans](https://theathletic.com/nba/team/pelicans/) finally stop disappointing us? Since drafting [Zion Williamson](https://theathletic.com/nba/player/zion-williamson-l6xjgWmi8X4OMdjm/) in 2019, it’s become an NBA pastime to talk up the Pelicans heading into the season, only to watch them begin the year 6-17 while ranked 29th in defense.
This time around, however, there are more reasons for optimism. Let’s start with the fact that the 2021-22 campaign concluded with some genuine on-court success. The Pelicans got off to their usual slow start (3-16) but slowly gained steam from there, finishing with a respectable-enough 36 wins. They replaced an ineffective opening-day backcourt, knocked off the [San Antonio Spurs](https://theathletic.com/nba/team/spurs/) and [LA Clippers](https://theathletic.com/nba/team/clippers/) in the Play-In ([with a big outside assist, but still](https://theathletic.com/news/clippers-paul-george-out/pOl7DwomY26w/)) and fought a 64-win [Phoenix Suns](https://theathletic.com/nba/team/suns/) team through six tough games before succumbing.
New Orleans did all that without Williamson playing a game, which is either a huge reason to believe in the Pels this season or a harbinger of what’s to come on his five-year max extension. Williamson [looked bouncy and svelte in preseason](https://theathletic.com/3606269/2022/09/19/zion-williamson-weight-pelicans/), but he has only played 85 games in his three pro seasons. With one of the most unusual body-athleticism combos in league annals, it remains to be seen whether his lower extremities can handle the forces placed on them night after night.
Williamson, undoubtedly, raises this team’s ceiling substantially. In his All-Star season in 2020-21, he took nearly *12 shots a game* at the rim and made 70 percent of them.
And yet … the odd part is that adding Williamson doesn’t change much about the fundamental strengths and weaknesses of this team; he mostly doubles down on what’s already there. The Pelicans were already deep at forward; Williamson plays the four. The Pelicans were already light on shooting; Williamson can’t shoot. And most importantly, the Pelicans were already suspect on defense, and Williamson, for all his offensive talent, has been consistently awful on that end in his brief career.
Two moves in 2021-22 at least helped balance out the equation. The first was the theft of Herb Jones with the 35th pick in the 2021 draft. He proved to be an elite on-ball defender right out of the chute and was one of the only three players to have both steal and block rates above 2.5 percent (joining [Matisse Thybulle](https://theathletic.com/nba/player/matisse-thybulle-FecSqxC1FV1DRBU7/) and [Robert Covington](https://theathletic.com/nba/player/robert-covington-u9E829AVwz1EFYDu/)). To a lesser extent, the late addition to the rotation of 6-foot pest [Jose Alvarado](https://theathletic.com/nba/player/jose-alvarado-znyKNsMl10GZNP1k/) also juiced the defense (plus, watching him was just fun as hell).
The other big decision was the trade for [CJ McCollum](https://theathletic.com/nba/player/cj-mccollum-6WC3b3hAgVqA0bZf/), which reoriented the roster to add more shooting, and cost a future first and a future second. The Pelicans sent out a good player ([Josh Hart](https://theathletic.com/nba/player/josh-hart-JL2KNArJke7GTrEU/)) who had a much more favorable contract than McCollum’s three-year, $100 million pact (which now has two years left and [was recently extended for another two](https://theathletic.com/3629816/2022/09/26/cj-mccollums-pelicans-contract/)). Thus, the net effect of this was to give the Pels a short-term upgrade in perimeter shooting at the cost of a lot of future flexibility. We’ll talk more about that in a bit.
The Pels also got a pleasant surprise when their moves cost significantly less draft capital than first imagined. The [Los Angeles Lakers’](https://theathletic.com/nba/team/lakers/) demise nuked the cost of the Steven Adams-Jonas Valančiūnas trade; the top-10 protection on that deal meant the Pelicans got to keep the eighth pick. Meanwhile, making the playoffs sent a first to Charlotte from the Devonte’ Graham trade (yeah, about that…) and kicked a future first from the [Milwaukee Bucks](https://theathletic.com/nba/team/bucks/) to Portland for McCollum.
However, the combined effect of trading for McCollum and [Larry Nance Jr.](https://theathletic.com/nba/player/larry-nance-jr-7CDgogl74yo30N8R/)’s salaries in the Portland deal, then extending both for two years, is that the Pelicans are extremely locked in salary-wise. Now that they’ve committed to a max extension for Williamson (which was always their only realistic play), they don’t have much flexibility left to do other things, especially since current ownership seems unlikely to commit to paying the luxury tax.
The Pelicans are $3.6 million south of the 2022-23 luxury tax, but the real fun starts next season and beyond. McCollum, Williamson and [Brandon Ingram](https://theathletic.com/nba/player/brandon-ingram-2qhGZCDXJ36YwTGU/) will combine to make just over $100 million each of the two seasons *after* this one and presumably more than that in 2025-26 if Ingram re-ups.
That’s manageable, for the moment, because the Pelicans have so many rotation players on rookie deals. Jones, Alvarado and [Naji Marshall](https://theathletic.com/nba/player/naji-marshall-cDcdOi2cm1gPv2zF/) make the minimum, [Trey Murphy III](https://theathletic.com/nba/player/trey-murphy-iii-OHIwHNCdjPaGfh6W/) isn’t making much more, and rookie Daniels is locked up at a reasonable rate for four years. Soon it will become far more challenging.
Even now, the Pelicans will have to do considerable gymnastics just to use any of their exception money next season and might not be able to re-sign [Jaxson Hayes](https://theathletic.com/nba/player/jaxson-hayes-IbCw8yXd8fKjLb8q/). The Pels are $7.8 million over next year’s projected tax line already, although they can get back under by waiving [Garrett Temple](https://theathletic.com/nba/player/garrett-temple-5c53TtCNO9BWk3sx/)’s non-guaranteed deal and declining the fourth-year option on [Kira Lewis Jr.](https://theathletic.com/nba/player/kira-lewis-jr-r6Op67Im3aJ6aVtY/) A more likely pathway is paying somebody to take Graham’s $12 million salary off their hands.
The Pelicans can also wheel and deal. They have all their own future first-round picks, plus a valuable unprotected first from the Lakers in 2024 (or 2025 if they choose to defer it). Twelve key players are already signed for 2023-24; it’s navigating after that where it gets tricky, but that’s two years into the future.
Nonetheless, the McCollum extension in particular feels like a double-down on an iffy bet against Father Time. Signing up for his age 31 and 32 seasons as the terms of a trade was one thing; willingly taking on the age 33 and 34 campaigns is quite another. The rising cap will reduce some of the sting, and McCollum’s shooting may help him age gracefully, but the track record of not-quite-star guards in their 30s is not great, Bob. The Pels had no urgent need to do this.
The bigger reason not to lock in, however, is that the Pelicans don’t really know what they have yet. Does it work with Williamson playing next to fellow masher Valančiūnas? Can they guard anybody lining up this way, or do they need to make a trade for a more versatile, switchable center? Where does Ingram’s game fit in next to Williamson? Do they need a real point guard, or can they get by with a McCollum/Ingram/Zion committee approach? If not, is Daniels that point guard? Meanwhile, they also extended Nance Jr., but can he stay healthy? He’s played 81 total games over the past two seasons and has never played more than 67 in a season.
The Pelicans essentially locked in this group as if they were the 2018 [Golden State Warriors](https://theathletic.com/nba/team/warriors/), a premature victory lap for a roster they haven’t seen on the court. They already painted themselves into this corner once by rushing to extend Adams before realizing he didn’t quite fit and may have done so again.
If things don’t work out as expected, the Pels do have an out because of their future draft picks (including a 2023 pick swap with the Lakers that could get them a late lottery pick). They don’t really need to add any more young players and thus can continue pulling from that pile of equity to try to piece together another trade or two. In particular, they might consider deals that return another quality wing and/or a switchable center.
Regardless of what the expensive guys do, however, the Pelicans have another layer of excitement this season with their youth contingent. Jones is already a locked-in starter; he’ll need to keep developing his shooting to play next to Williamson, but his defense is essential. Alvarado was an incredible find as an undrafted two-way; like Williamson, he needs to convince defenses he can shoot, but few are better at pressuring the ball (or hiding in the corner after a made basket). Murphy, a summer-league Hall of Famer, shot 38.2 percent from 3 in his rookie year; if he ever makes a shot inside the arc, the Pels will have a nice combo forward off the bench.
But the real pearl here may be Daniels. He’s a big guard who can defend one through three, he’s a good ballhandler and passer and a plus athlete, and the pre-draft background on him was excellent. He’s 19 and still needs work — he was an average-to-good player in the G League last season but hardly dominant — so his impact may not be felt for a while. He also has one big question mark: shooting. However, the Pelicans are fortunate to employ perhaps the best shooting coach in the league in Fred Vinson.
The Pels’ second-rounder, forward Liddell, is an interesting prospect in his own right. However, he tore his ACL in summer league and will miss the season. Late second-round big man Matković has some athletic bounce but will be stashed in Europe for the foreseeable future. Finally, keep an eye on undrafted two-way [Dereon Seabron](https://theathletic.com/nba/player/dereon-seabron-fqOaD96qEwqpkuEn/), a slashing non-shooter who also might benefit from Vinson’s magic.
As for 2022-23, the upside is undeniable; if Williamson stays healthy and everything clicks, this team could brute-force its way to 55 wins, a la last year’s [Grizzlies](https://theathletic.com/nba/team/grizzlies/). But abundant questions remain — about health, about shooting, about defense. There are too many lineups with three non-shooters and little defensive switchability.
Relative to the last few years, that result still should be a successful season. It’s hard to imagine this team failing to win half its games, which would be its first winning season in five years and only the third since [Chris Paul](https://theathletic.com/nba/player/chris-paul-T2sfGOMEeDjjOrJH/) left in 2011. Whatever Williamson’s health turns out to be, he’ll play more games than he did last season, when the team was already pretty good by the end of the year. The overall youth of the roster should be a wind at their backs as well.
On paper, there are eight clear playoff-caliber teams in the West, and this is one of them. There’s a lot of variance in this estimate and some questions about what this looks like going forward, but for 2022-23, the median outcome looks pretty good.
## Prediction: 48-34, sixth in Western Conference
by kingralek
1 Comment
I like the prediction and don’t think it’s far off. A full season of CJ, health for Zion and not too many games missed by the core should be attainable.